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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 
78A-4-103(2)O). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
ISSUE I: Did the trial court err by determining that actual ownership of the 
property was irrelevant to an action for unlawful detainer pursuant to Utah Code 
section 78B-6-802.5? 
a. Standard of review: A trial court's interpretation ofa statute is 
reviewed for correctness, affording no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions. See In re Baby Girl T., 2012 UT 78, if 9,298 P.3d 1251. 
b. Preservation: T. 1076: 5-6. 
ISSUE II: Did the trial court err by determining that Mr. York's request for 
discovery sanctions were untimely even when Mr. York had raised this issue 
earlier and when the trial court had instructed Mr. York to raise his motions at 
trial? 
a. Standard of review: A determination that a motion is untimely involves 
a mixed question of fact and law. The factual determination of when a motion is 
raised is reviewed for clear error, and the embedded legal determination of when 
the motion should have been raised is reviewed for correctness. See In re Adoption 
of Baby B., 2012 UT 8, if 47,270 P.3d 486. 
b. Preservation: T. 1075: 20-21; T. 1076: 15-19. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code section 78B-6-802.5 
A previous owner, trustor, or mortgagor of a property is guilty of unlawful 
detainer if the person: 
(I) defaulted on his or her obligations resulting in disposition of the 
property by a trustee's sale or sheriff's sale; and 
(2) continues to occupy the property after the trustee's sale or sheriff's sale 
after being served with a notice to quit by the purchaser. 
Utah Constitution Article XXII Section 1 
The Legislature shall provide by statute for an exemption of a homestead, which 
may consist of one or more parcels of lands, together with the appurtenances and 
improvements thereon, from sale on execution. 
Utah Code section 78B-5-502(3) 
A homestead is exempt from ... forced sale except for ... security interests in the 
property ... for debts created for the purchase price of the property. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from an action for unlawful detainer before the 
honorable Judge James Brady of the Fourth District Court for the State of Utah, 
Millard County. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred by forbidding Mr. York from arguing at trial that the 
underlying foreclosure and trustee's sale of his home was invalid. Utah law has 
long recognized the relevance of actual ownership in an unlawful detainer action 
following a trustee's sale. This Court should reverse and remand with instructions 
that Mr. York should be allowed to argue this and any other affirmative defenses. 
The trial court also erred by failing to consider Mr. York's motion for 
sanctions based on discovery violations. Mr. York was denied essential discovery 
concerning his argument that the trustee's sale was invalid. Mr. York raised this 
issue at a hearing in Novennber 2012. When Mr. York asked for sanctions before 
the trial in December 2012, the trial court refused to address it because it 
mistakenly believed that Mr. York had never raised the issue before. Therefore, 
this Court should remand with instructions to the trial court to consider Mr. York's 
motion for discovery sanctions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant, Mr. York, obtained a mortgage loan from Ameriquest 
Mortgage Company in June 2004. R. 836. The loan was secured by a property in 
Delta, Utah that Mr. York purchased. R. 835. 
On March 26, 2013, the Appellee, Deutsche Banlc, as trustee for an entity 
titled Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through 
Certificates, Series 2004-R8, brought an unlawful detainer action against Mr. 
6 
York. R. 0001. Acting pro se, Mr. York answered that Deutsche Bank had failed 
to state a claim for which relief could be granted. R. 15. Over the course of the 
next few months, Mr. York attempted to argue that Ameriquest Mortgage 
Company and the new entity, Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed 
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-RS, had participated in fraudulent 
activities that precluded it from brining the current action. Acting prose, Mr. York 
filed a counterclaim in state court, R. 21, and a federal claim, R. 15 8. Deutsche 
Bank, as trustee for Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2004-R8, did not dispute the state counterclaim on the 
merits. See R. 139-141. Instead it argued that Mr. York should not have brought a 
federal claim that was identical to the state claim and that his counterclaim failed 
to meet the pleading and notice standards. Id. On August 17, 2012, the federal 
court dismissed Mr. York's prose claim because he failed to meet the pleading 
standard. R. 325-329. On August 28, 2012, after taking judicial notice of the 
federal court's decision, the trial cowt issued a memorandum decision dismissing 
Mr. York's state counterclaim as well. R. 334. 
On September 4, 2012, Mr. York attempted to amend his counterclaim so 
that it would adhere to the pleading requirements. R. 353-513. On October 24, 
2012, a bench trial was scheduled on the matter for November 21, 2012. R. 572. 
On the day of the hearing, Mr. York came prepared to argue his amended 
counterclaim, among other issues. The trial court, however, informed Mr. York 
that in reviewing the case for trial it became apparent that it had failed to issue a 
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decision on the amended counterclaim and dismiss third-party defendants. T. 
1075: 3. The trial court explained: 
My reason for that was in my order. And I thought that it was clear 
to everybody that the only parties remaining are the plaintiffs and 
Mr. York. 
However, in my review, I did not find that order in my 
computer and so I reviewed with my clerks the status and where that 
order had gone, and what I found is that although the order had been 
signed back in October, for whatever reason it was not entered into 
the computer. It was not in the Court's file .... As of, I believe, 
Monday of this week the document was in the Court's file and was 
in the electronic file. 
T. 1075: 3-4. 
The trial court also determined that Mr. York's amended counterclaim was 
not properly served on either the third-party defendants or on Deutsche Bank 
because Mr. York had used certified mail. T. 1075: 4. The trial court stated that 
Id. 
certified mailing is only service under certain federal rules. 
It's not service under the state rules. 
So whether we deal with the original counterclaim cross-
claim made by Mr. York or whether we deal by the amended 
counter-claim cross-claim we still have no service. With no service 
under the rules the matter is dismissed. 
Mr. York explained, 
I filed the amended complaint because the original complaint 
was defective when it was filed in the federal court. It was only half 
there so I filed the counter-complaint, had everybody served. You're 
saying that service by certified mail-I thought I'd read the rule that 
it was allowed. 
Id. at 6. 
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The trial court replied that "certified mail on an initial complaint is not 
adequate service." Id. The trial court, however, did not address whether Mr. 
York's counterclaim against Deutsche Bank was properly served. 
Mr. York also filed a motion to dismiss that apparently went missing and 
was not "entered into the computer by clerks or received by the Court." 
Id. at 11. The trial court determined that it would let Mr. York address that issue 
before the hearing. However, before Mr. York could do so, the trial court asked 
Mr. York to explain his motion to delay the trial because of problems with 
discovery. Id. at 12. Instead of addressing why the hearing should be delayed, Mr. 
York kept trying to explain why he did not think that Ameriquest Mortgage 
Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R8 had 
proper title to his home and therefore could not evict him. The trial court 
emphasized several times that Mr. York could raise this argument later. The trial 
court stated, "It's an argument you may have in your quiver of arguments, but it's 
not a reason not to proceed with trial .... I may or may not grant relief to the other 
plaintiff that's named that you have a concern about, but that doesn't say we can't 
go f01ward with the trial and have you present those arguments at trial." Id. at 17. 
Mr. York responded, "Well, I'm talking about the real party in interest, the 
real owner.'' Id. at 18. 
The trial court replied once again, "Right. And those would be arguments 
you could raise at trial because they haven't been raised before." Id. 
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After refusing to hear Mr. York,s arguments about who had the right to 
initiate an unlawful detainer action against him, the trial court decided to delay the 
trial because Deutsche Bank had not provided some discovery documents in a 
timely manner. Id. at 29. Deutsche Bank sent some of the requested discovery 
documents to Mr. York the day before the hearing, in violation of the trial court's 
order to provide all discovery documents at least seven days before the hearing. Id. 
at 13. Mr. York had also requested discovery so that he could detennine who 
actually had title to his home, but was simply ignored. Id. at 14. 
A new trial date was set. The trial court once again told Mr. York to reserve 
his arguments about actual ownership of the home for trial. "There's a time and a 
place for everything. Today we're not going to conduct any arguments that are not 
filed in a motion without the plaintiff having notice. So if you wish to address that 
issue by written document, there's time. If you prefer to do it at the time of the 
trial, there's time then." Id. at 33. 
Following the trial court's instructions, Mr. York filed a written motion the 
day before the rescheduled hearing. R. 721. Among other things, Mr. York asked 
the trial court to apply sanctions to the plaintiff for violating rule 26 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 724-727. Mr. York also asserted that Ameriquest 
Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-
RS did not have title to his home because the document that transferred interest to 
it was created through fraudulent robo-signing. R. 727-729. Mr. York singled out 
the Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust, which purported to assign the original 
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Deed of Trust from A.meriquest Mortgage Company to Deutsche Bank National 
Trust Company, as trustee for Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc. Asset-Backed 
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R8. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 7. The 
document appears to be signed by Crystal Moore and witnessed by Bryan J. Bly. 
Id. As Mr. York pointed out, Crystal Moore and Bryan J. Bly are well known 
robo-signers. See R. 728; See also William Alden and Ryan McCarthy, The Most 
Shocking Statements From Alleged Foreclosure 'Robo-signers ', Huffington Post 
(November 13, 2010) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/I l/13/foreclosure-
robo-signers-statements_n_78303 l.html ("[Crystal Moore, Bryan Bly, and 
Dhurata Doko] admit they didn't read thousands of documents they signed daily, 
and they betray ignorance of key aspects of the mortgage industry. In some cases, 
according to testimony, their signatures were affixed to documents without their 
knowledge."). 
During the hearing, however, the trial court flatly denied all of Mr. York's 
attempts to raise or argue these issues. 
As to Mr. York's request for sanctions under rule 26, the trial court stated 
that the timeliness of the motion was ''not adequate." T. 1076: 15. The trial court 
stated that because the motion ''wasn't raised until the moment of trial," it would 
not address it. Id. Mr. York then directed the trial court to the minute entry from 
the November 21, 2012 hearing. He said, "The notes that I had here, the minute 
entry, at 10 :3 8 Court rules and finds under Rule 26 initial disclosures were not 
made. I did raise that." Id. Despite this, the trial court declined to consider the 
11 
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motion for sanctions under rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the 
continuing discovery violations. 
The trial court also prevented Mr. York from arguing that the Corporate 
Deed of Trust was invalid and that the underlying foreclosure was fraudulent. The 
trial court asked Mr. York why he even needed discovery for an eviction hearing. 
He replied, ''Well, if a foreclosure was not legally done, that would affect an 
eviction proceeding." T. 1076: 24. The trial court then stated, "But you understand 
those are not the issues I'm considering. So if you're exploring whether the 
foreclosure was legal, that is immaterial to today's hearing." Id. 
The trial court later explained in more detail: 
You raise a very interesting question .... So that's an issue 
for another day, another hearing, perhaps a different court, maybe 
me, but at this time I only have one issue before me and that is a 
question of who has the right to possess that land. Not the right of 
ownership. 
And I know those are two different features that we don't 
always separate in our minds, but in terms of a legal analysis I'm not 
dealing with ownership questions. I'm dealing with possessory 
interests. 
T. 1076: 25-26. 
Despite several more attempts, the trial court never allowed Mr. York an 
opportunity to argue that Deutsche Bank, as trustee for Ameriquest Mortgage 
Securities Inc. Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-RS, did not 
own his home and therefore could not bring an unlawful detainer action against 
him. Mr. York also attempted to assail the validity of the foreclosure sale based on 
the notice and timing of the sale. T. 1076: 104-06. Deutsche Bank objected 
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arguing that "the Court has explained in RM Lifesty Ies versus RM Lifestyles that 
the appropriate time to raise those questions in challenging the foreclosure sale is 
not in an unlawful detainer action."1 Id. at 107. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled against Mr. York and 
evicted him from his home. Mr. York filed a timely appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court erred in determining that ownership was irrelevant in an 
unlawful detainer action. 
Mr. York should have had the opportunity to defend himself in the action 
for unlawful detainer by arguing that Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc. Asset-
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R8 did not own his home and 
therefore could not bring the action in the first place. Utah courts have long 
recognized the right of a defendant in an unlawful detainer action to assert the 
affirmative defense that the purported owner does not actually own the property in 
question. See, e.g., Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass 'n v. Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, 311 P .3d 
1004. 
Utah Code section 78B-6-802.5 explains that a person is guilty of unlawful 
detainer if there is a trustee's sale and the person continues to stay in the home 
1 Mr. York's counsel was unable to identify any Utah appellate case titled "RM 
Lifestyles versus RM Lifestyles." This was most likely a reference to RM 
Lifestyles, LLC v. Ellison, 2011 UT App 290, 263 P .3d 1152. The holding in that 
case, however, does not support Deutsche Bank's conclusion. This will be 
discussed in more detail in the argument section. 
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after the purchaser at the trustee sale provides a notice of eviction. See Utah Code 
Ann.§ 78B-6-802.5(1}-(2) (LexisNexis 2012). The validity of the trustee's sale 
then becomes an essential inquiry in an unlawful detainer action. In Sundquist, 
2013 UT 45, a national bank brought an unlawful detainer action against a Utah 
woman. Id. ,i 1. The Utah woman argued in her defense that the national bank had 
not complied with Utah law regarding the trustee's sale and, as a result, did not 
have ownership of her property and could not evict her. Id. ,r 8. The Utah Supreme 
Court determined that the trustee's sale was invalid and reversed and remanded to 
the trial court to consider that issue and other arguments against the validity of the 
national bank's title. Id. ,r 50. 
Recently, in Capri Sunshine, LLC v. E & C Fox Investments, LLC, 2015 UT 
App 231, this Court spent a great deal of time determining the validity of a series 
of forced sales to determine who had actual ownership and the right to bring an 
unlawful detainer action. Id. ,i 21. This Court determined that Capri, the party that 
brought the unlawful detainer action, had failed to prove the "necessary element" 
of ownership. Id. Therefore, Capri's unlawful detainer action failed. Id. 123. 
It is important to note that in Capri Sunshine, one of the trustee's sales in 
question was found to be invalid by the trial court because it occurred at 9:45 a.m. 
instead of9:00 a.m. as advertised. Id. ,i 4. While the appellate case was decided on 
other grounds, the district court set aside the sale, noting that the defect in the 
notice of the sale caused a chilling effect. Id. ,r 6. 
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In RM Lifestyles, LLC v. Ellison, 2011 UT App 290, 263 P.3d 1152, this 
Court once again considered the validity of a trustee's sale in the context of an 
unlawful detainer action. Id. ,r 12. This Court determined that the defendants had 
fully participated in the trial but had not produced "any evidence that the alleged 
irregularity [in the trustee's sale] resulted in their receiving defective notice of the 
sale or in any other way affected their ability to protect their rights." Id. iJ 18. 
Because of the lack of evidence presented, this Court affirmed "the trial court's 
decision that the trustee's sale was valid and its ultimate determination that the 
[defendants] unlawfully detained the Property after the trustee's sale." Id. 
In this case, the trial court actively prevented Mr. York from presenting 
evidence to support his contention that the trustee's sale was invalid. Mr. York 
wanted to argue that the assignment of the deed to Deutsche Bank as trustee was 
fraudulent and that the trustee's sale was late and contained irregularities that 
caused a chilling effect. When Mr. York attempted to do so, Deutsche Bank 
argued that a case called "RM Lifestyles versus RM Lifestyles" held that the that 
the "appropriate time to raise those questions in challenging the foreclosure sale is 
not in an unlawful detainer action." T. 1076: 107. It is unclear to which case 
Deutsche Bank was referring. If it was referring to RM Lifestyles, however, it 
misstated the holding. In RM Lifestyles the defendants in an unlawful detainer 
action lost precisely because they had the opportunity to attack the validity of the 
trustee's sale but did not present enough evidence of harm. RM Lifestyles, 2011 
UT App 290, ,r 18. That is opposite of this case. Mr. York wanted to address the 
15 
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issue of ownership by questioning witnesses and presenting evidence obtained 
through discovery, but the trial court did not allow him to do so and refused to 
consider the validity of the trustee's sale at all. 
Instead, the trial court impermissibly attempted to bifurcate the 
proceedings. The trial court said that ownership was 
an issue for another day, another hearing, perhaps a different 
court, maybe me, but at this time I only have one issue before me 
and that is a question of who has the right to possess that land. Not 
the right of ownership. 
And I know those are two different features that we don't 
always separate in our minds, but in terms of a legal analysis I'm not 
dealing with ownership questions. I'm dealing with possessory 
interests. 
T. 1076: 25-26. 
Based on the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, 
however, and based on this Court's determinations in Capri Sunshine, 2015 UT 
App 231, and RM Lifestyles, 2011 UT App 290, the trial court erred in denying 
Mr. York an opportunity to challenge the validity of Ameriquest Mortgage 
Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R8's 
ownership of the property. 
A. Mr. York is not estopped from challenging the validity of the 
trustee's sale. 
In some early unlawful detainer actions, some Utah courts held that a 
''tenant is estopped from disputing the title of his landlord." See, e.g., Williams v. 
Nelson, 231 P. 217, 219 (Utah 1925) (citation and internal quotation marks 
16 
omitted). The idea was that if a person voluntarily entered into a tenant 
relationship with a landlord, then that indicated the tenant's belief that the landlord 
held title to the property. A tenant, then, was estopped from arguing otherwise in 
an unlawful detainer action. See id. at 220. 
This case, however, does not involve a tenant/landlord relationship. Instead 
it is an unlawful detainer action following a trustee's sale. As such, Mr. York is 
not estopped in any way from challenging the validity of that sale and the ultimate 
ownership of the property in question. 
II. Ignoring ownership in an unlawful detainer action violates the Utah 
Constitution. 
The Homestead Exemption in the Utah Constitution would be violated if 
Utah law allowed for unlawful detainer actions to proceed without regard to actual 
ownership. 
Utah Const. art. XXII, § I orders the Utah Legislature to "provide by 
statute for an exemption of a homestead, which may consist of one or more parcels 
of lands, together with the appurtenances and improvements thereon, from sale on 
execution." Accordingly, the Utah Legislature has enacted Utah Code section 
78B-5-503, which states that a home is not subject to a trustee's sale unless there 
are "security interests in the property ... for debts created for the purchase price 
17 
of the property." Utah Code Ann. § 75B-5-503(3)(b).2 On May 2, 1895, Mr. 
Andersen, one of the delegates to the Utah Constitutional Convention, spoke in 
favor of the constitutional protection of homes from forced sale. Echoing the 
sentiments of many others, he said, "It is a provision to protect the poor and the 
weak-those who need protection. The money lender and the rich man take care 
of themselves. If a section of this kind or an article of this kind is in the 
Constitution, they will be more careful." Utah Constitutional Convention, Sixtieth 
Day (May 2, 1895) available at http://le.utah.gov/documents/conconv/60.htm. 
Considering all this, if a trial court allows an international bank to come in 
and kick a person out of his or her home, the bank must, at the very least, prove 
that the forced sale of the home fits into one of the statutory exemptions. As Mr. 
Andersen said in 1895, the intent of the provision was to make the money lenders 
and rich be careful in how they deal with Utah citizens. 
In this case, Deutsche Bank as trustee for Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, 
Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-RS, came to Utah and 
kicked Mr. York out of his home. The whole time Mr. York was attempting to 
show that the trustee's sale was invalid. If Mr. York is correct and there was fraud 
in the transfer of the deed, then the sale of the property would not be based on a 
security interest in the property for debts created to purchase the property. His 
property then is exempt from forced sale under the Utah Constitution from any 
2 There are three other exceptions, but none of them appears to apply to the current 
situation. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-503(3) (LexisNexis 2012). 
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entity except the true owner, who would be the only entity capable of proving the 
required security interest. Because the trial court did not allow Mr. York to make 
this argument in the unlawful detainer action, the proceeding violated the Utah 
Constitution and should be reversed. 
III. The trial court erred in failing to consider Mr. York's request for 
sanctions as untimely. 
The trial court clearly erred when it concluded that Mr. York had not raised 
his concerns about discovery earlier. The trial court also erred by instructing Mr. 
York to raise his discovery issues in a motion at trial and then refusing to hear it 
when he did. An appellate court will not set aside a trial court's findings as clearly 
erroneous unless they are "against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the 
appellate court otherwise reaches a definitive and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made." State v. Walker, 734 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
In this case the trial court said it would not consider Mr. York's motion on 
discovery issues because he should have raised it earlier. T. 1076: 15. Mr. York 
then directed the trial court to the minute entry from the November 21, 2012 
hearing where he did raise the issue. Id.; see also T. 1075: 13-14. In fact, in a 
lengthy discussion, at the earlier hearing, the trial court said, "So your objection 
might be as to specific items that they want to present as evidence because it 
wasn't timely given to you. ls that correct?" Id. Mr. York replied, "Well, what I'm 
saying is they didn't comply with the court order. It cut me pretty short." Id. Mr. 
19 
York also complained that he had sent a discovery request to Deutsche Banlc 
trying to determine who had actual ownership of the home, but was ignored. Id. at 
14. 
In response to all this, the trial court told Mr. York, "There's a time and a 
place for everything. Today we're not going to conduct any arguments that are not 
filed in a motion without the plaintiff having notice. So if you wish to address that 
issue by written document, there's time. If you prefer to do it at the time of the 
trial, there's time then.'' Id. at 33. 
But when Mr. York attempted to address these issues at trial, the trial court 
said it was too late. As a result, it seems that the trial court was clearly in error 
about when and how Mr. York first raised his discovery issues. Therefore, this 
Court should reverse and remand with instructions that the trial court now fully 
consider Mr. York's timely request for sanctions under rule 26. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellant respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court to allow the Appellant to 
challenge the validity of the trustee's sale and to consider rule 26 sanctions against 
Deutsche Bank. The Appellant further requests an award of cost incurred on 
appeal according to rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
20 
RESPEC1FULLYsUBMITIEDoN .. f2cfrb. ?7 _?-!J.~ 
~'-arshall Thomps n 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
No addendum is necessary. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(l l). 
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